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Background: Uganda changed its malaria treatment policy in response to evidence of resistance to commonly
used antimalarials. The use of evidence in policy development—also referred to as knowledge translation (KT)—is
crucial, especially in resource-limited settings. However, KT processes occur amidst a complex web of stakeholder
interactions. Stakeholder involvement in evidence generation and in KT activities is essential. In the present
study, we explored how stakeholders impacted the uptake of evidence in the malaria treatment policy change
in Uganda.
Methods: We employed a qualitative case study methodology involving interviews with key informants and
review of documents. A timeline of events was developed, which guided the purposive sampling of
respondents and identification of relevant documents. Data were analysed using inductive content analysis
techniques.
Results: Stakeholders played multiple roles in evidence uptake in the malaria treatment policy change. Donors,
the Ministry of Health (MoH), service providers, and researchers engaged in the role of evidence generation. The
MoH, parliamentarians, and opinion leaders at the national and local levels engaged in dissemination of
evidence. The donors, MoH, researchers, and service providers engaged in the uptake of evidence in policy
development and implementation. Stakeholders exerted varying levels of support and influence for different
reasons. It is noteworthy that all of the influential stakeholders were divided regarding the best antimalarial
alternative to adopt.
Conclusion: Our results showed a diverse group of stakeholders who played multiple roles, with varying levels
of support and influence on the uptake of evidence in the malaria treatment policy change. For a given KT
processes, mapping the relevant stakeholders and devising mechanism for their engagement and for how to
resolve conflicts of interest and disagreements a priori will enhance uptake of evidence in policy development.
Keywords: Knowledge translation, Stakeholders, Malaria, Treatment policy changeBackground
Since 2001, Uganda has changed its malaria treatment
policy twice, after efficacy studies demonstrated significant
resistance against first-line antimalarials [1,2] beyond the
thresholds at which the World Health Organisation
(WHO) recommends policy change [3]. The use of evi-
dence in policy development is of critical importance,
especially in resource-limited settings; however, data* Correspondence: julienabyonga@yahoo.com
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article, unless otherwise stated.suggest that its potential has yet to be fully realised
[4,5]. Here, evidence is broadly defined to include re-
search study results (both published and unpublished),
findings of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) studies
and population-based surveys, Ministry of Health (MoH)
reports, community complaints, and clinician observa-
tions [6,7]. The application of such evidence in policy de-
velopment is also referred to as knowledge translation
(KT), which the Canadian Institute of Health Research
defines as “a dynamic and iterative process that in-
cludes synthesis, dissemination, exchange and ethicallyd Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public
mons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this
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provide more effective health services and products,
and strengthen the health care system” [8]. Efforts to
improve KT—including developing KT models and
implementing several KT activities—have produced mixed
results [9-12].
KT processes occur amidst a complex web of interac-
tions between stakeholders, who are hereby defined as
individuals who, or institutions which are affected by the
policy change, directly influence it, or have an interest in
the outcome even when not directly involved [13]. In
this article, we use the words stakeholders and actors
interchangeably. Scholars have noted that the roles played
by stakeholders and their level of influence, support, and
interactions have an important impact on how evidence
influences policy [14,15]. Mori et al. documented in-
stances where essential medicines were selected based on
the experience and discretionary judgment of experts, des-
pite the availability of hard efficacy data [4]. Cases where
stakeholder involvement has delayed the translation of
evidence into policy have also been documented [16,17].
For example, delays have been attributed to researchers
devoting more time to generating evidence than to dis-
seminating their results [17].
The available literature highlights several potential
roles that stakeholders may play in KT. For example,
civil society organisations (CSOs)—which here are de-
fined as formally organised non-profit groups concerned
with public interests [18]—reportedly advocate for evi-
dence uptake, undertaking research, mobilising communi-
ties to demand evidence implementation, and implementing
evidence in their own programmes [18-20]. On the other
hand, communities can participate in research processes as
respondents but also in setting the research agenda [21,22].
The media can be an effective ally in evidence dissemin-
ation, community mobilisation, and shaping public opinion
[21,23,24], while policymakers are responsible for translating
evidence into policies and putting the necessary KT plat-
forms into place for engagement among stakeholders [9,24].
Donors fulfil the main role of funding the research, KT
activities, and implementation of research findings [9,25].
Finally, researchers can intervene as stakeholders who
generate evidence [7,11,25].
Tomlinson et al. point out that the specific compos-
ition, roles, and impact of stakeholders in KT are influ-
enced by the context within which KT processes take
place and the nature of the policy [26]. For example,
Woelk et al. studied the uptake of evidence on malaria
control and treatment of eclampsia in three Southern
African countries and documented a wide range of
international stakeholders influencing the former, while
mainly international academic networks influenced the
latter [27]. Indeed, actors have played different KT roles
with regard to malaria treatment policy changes. Forexample, researchers and policymakers were instrumental
in synthesising and disseminating evidence on the effect-
iveness of artemisinin combination therapies (ACTs) in
Burkina Faso [28], while policymakers have been weak in
evidence synthesis in other KT processes [24]. In Sudan,
an NGO took the lead in putting a KT platform into place
[29], which has been the role of ministries of health in
other instances [9]. In Tanzania, pharmaceutical manufac-
turers and medicine traders reportedly influenced malaria
treatment policy changes through their opposition to the
change from chloroquine (CQ) to sulfadoxine/pyrimeth-
amine (SP), as the former had invested in continued CQ
production, while the latter still had large CQ stocks [16].
The WHO has been instrumental in providing technical
guidance on malaria treatment policies at both the global
and national levels [23,29], which is not the case in other
policy processes—for example, health financing.
The present study is part of a larger study that seeks
to enhance our understanding of how we can improve
evidence uptake in health policy development. In our
previous work, we explored the roles, relationships, and
interactions of key stakeholders involved in KT in Uganda,
without specific reference to a piece of evidence or a pol-
icy. Nabyonga Orem et al. showed that stakeholders in KT
were perceived to play both positive and negative roles, as
well as identified the challenges that they had to overcome
to effectively play the positive roles (Table 1) [30].
In the present article, we explore how different stake-
holders have shaped evidence uptake in relation to mal-
aria treatment policy change in Uganda, with specific
assessment of the roles they played and their level of in-
fluence and support. Furthermore, we investigated the
extent to which the previously identified roles of stake-
holders in KT in Uganda [30] differed from their roles
specifically in relation to malaria treatment policy change.
For this project, we employed a case study approach, using
qualitative methods involving interviews with key infor-
mants (KIs) and review of documents. The case analysed
was the malaria treatment policy change from CQ/SP to
ACT—more specifically, artemether-lumefantrine (AL)—
which transpired over a period of 25 months between
March 2004 and April 2006 in Uganda.
Methods
This case study employed qualitative methods to ex-
plore how the involved stakeholders impacted evidence
uptake in the malaria treatment policy change process.
The case study approach was chosen based on the
need to understand complex contextual issues [31].
Data were collected between June 2012 and August
2013. To enhance the validity of our results, we employed
multiple data collection methods and member checking
[31]. Prior to finalisation, preliminary results were reviewed
by stakeholders who were central to the policy case: two
Table 1 Summary of roles of stakeholders in KT related to health policy development in Uganda
Stakeholder Roles Challenges to overcome Links that need to be built
CSOs -Uptake of evidence in policy development
and implementation
-Need skills in navigating the political terrain,
networking, and engaging policymakers
-Links among CSOs, researchers,
and policymakers
-Dissemination of evidence -Must be provided with clear and simplified
formats to avoid misrepresenting the evidence
-Advocating for evidence implementation -Must be funded independently of the
government
Policymakers -Uptake of evidence in policy development -Capacity to synthesise evidence -Links between policymakers and
researchers
-Establishing platforms for KT and playing
a leadership role
Media -Dissemination of evidence -Need to be provided with evidence in simplified
and preferably written formats
-Links between researchers and
the media
Parliamentarians -Dissemination of evidence -Require targeted dissemination to
parliamentarians
-Links among researchers and
parliamentarians
-Community mobilisation
Communities -Participation in research processes -Putting into place community structures to
enable their participation in research processes
-Links between communities and
researchers
Donors -Funding research and implementation
of evidence
-Governments must establish structures for
developing research agendas through
inclusive participatory partnerships
Researchers -Evidence generation -Focusing on academic interests
Source: Nabyonga Orem et al. [30].
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ameliorated by interviewing a wide range of knowledgeable
stakeholders and by the use of multiple data sources [31].
A timeline of key events was drawn based on the review
of documents, in consultation with two persons from the
WHO and two persons from the MoH who had each held
malaria-focused positions for over 10 years. This timeline
guided the identification of key milestones, the involved
processes, the key documents to be reviewed, and the in-
stitutions involved, which subsequently informed the se-
lection of respondents (Figure 1).
Stakeholder analysis
A stakeholder analysis was undertaken to assess the
roles, level of support, and influence of the actors re-
garding evidence uptake in the malaria treatment policy
change. Stakeholder analysis is a powerful tool that can
be retrospectively used to understand the roles, interests,
and influences of the different stakeholders in the evolu-
tion of policy context and processes [32]. Here, our re-
search team drew upon the work of Eden and Ackermann
[33] and Bryson [34] in undertaking the analysis and
classifying the stakeholders using the influence/power-
support/interest grid.
Selection of respondents
Using the timeline of key events, we identified institutions
that were involved in the policy process. We selected KIs
using purposive sampling with the main criterion beingtheir involvement in either research, design, or implemen-
tation of the malaria treatment policy change [35]. From
each of the key institutions, we selected the focal persons
involved in the policy change process and employed the
snowballing technique to identify other key respondents
until reaching descriptive saturation [36,37]. Some of the
identified respondents had since moved on to other em-
ployment or retired, and these persons were categorised
under the institutions that they worked for at the time of
the policy change. The identified focal researchers were
selected for interviews if they had been involved in malaria
research and had provided evidence that was considered
in the policy change process. Emphasis was placed on col-
lecting their perceptions in line with the study questions,
beyond what they may have published in scientific papers
and research reports.
To obtain perceptions from across the spectrum of the
health-care delivery system, we purposively selected two
districts of high malaria endemicity [38], based on prox-
imity and presence of a regional referral hospital (Jinja
district) or general hospital (Mpigi). Within these dis-
tricts, two hospitals and two lower level facilities (one
public and one private not-for-profit in both districts)
were purposively selected based on proximity and our de-
sire to include different levels of the health-care system.
At the district level, we purposively selected the district
health officer and a member of the district health team
in charge of supervising health facilities within the district.
Finally, we purposively selected the medical superintendent
Figure 1 Process, timelines, and stakeholders involved in the malaria treatment policy change.
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Total number of respondents 31
aOne of the selected districts did not have a private not-for-profit hospital.
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member responsible for the outpatient department at each
health facility, as these employees interface with patients
on a daily basis and are more likely to know the malaria
burden, community health-seeking behaviours, and inter-
faced often with the supervising teams.
The selected respondents included public policymakers,
donor representatives, media, CSOs, researchers, and rep-
resentatives of the pharmaceutical sector. We also inter-
viewed managers of health services at the district level,
health-care providers from the public and private not-for-
profit health facilities, the National Medical Stores (NMS)
in charge of medicine procurement and distribution and
the National Drug Authority (NDA) in charge of medicine
regulation (Table 2).
KIs were interviewed using an in-depth interview
guide that comprised open-ended questions designed to
elicit the respondents’ perceptions on whether evidence
had been used and who the stakeholders were, the roles
they played, and their level of interest in and support for
evidence uptake in the policy change process. The
interview guide was developed by the first author, was
reviewed and refined by the research team, and was
pretested with two volunteer colleagues in the WHO
Uganda office, two technical officers in the MoH, and
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Public Health. KIs were contacted by email or tele-
phone and invited to participate in the study. All identified
respondents agreed to participate and were interviewed.
All interviews were conducted by the first author, in
English and face-to-face. The interviews lasted an aver-
age of 45 min. During the interviews, the first author
made additional notes to record initial findings and
impressions that were used to augment the transcribed
interviews.
Selection of relevant documents
The timeline of key events guided the identification of rele-
vant documents to be reviewed. We included a broad range
of documents relevant to the case to ascertain the processes
involved, the stakeholders, and their roles. All identified
documents were retrieved and reviewed. Additional file 1
presents details of the reviewed documents.
Data analysis
Interviews were recorded, transcribed verbatim, and en-
tered into MS Word software for editing as the first step
towards a “formal” analysis. All interviews and reviewed
documents were coded using QRS Nvivo Software Version
10. Content analysis techniques were used to construct
emerging categories linked to the research issues [39]. In
the first step, the first author read all of the transcribed in-
terviews and relevant documents to identify categories of
emerging issues with regard to the involved stakeholders,
the roles they played, whether they were supportive, and
their possible influence on evidence uptake in the policy
process. Next, the study team together analysed the tran-
scripts in order to identify categories of emerging issues ac-
cording to type of stakeholder, which were organised based
on research areas. Inductive manifest content analysis was
undertaken to assess how respondents perceived and how
documents reflected the role(s) played by the different
stakeholders, while inductive thematic content analysis was
undertaken to assess the level of support and influence
of the different stakeholders. Examples are shown in
Additional file 2a and b.
Converging issues were again reviewed by the rest of
the research team. Where interpretation differed, con-
sensus was achieved through revisiting the raw data and
discussions. Where necessary, quotations that best rep-
resented emerging issues were slightly edited for flow,
while preserving the meaning of the text. The findings
from document analysis and from the analysis of KI in-
terviews were integrated throughout the analysis.
Informed consent was obtained from all respondents
prior to the interviews. Study participants were informed
about the purpose of the study and the scope of issues
in the in-depth interview guide. Confidentiality was en-
sured in data management, and only aggregate informationwithout subject identifiers is reported. All data were
secured in a safe location accessible only to the study
team. Ethical approval was obtained from the Institu-
tional Review Board of the Institute of Tropical Medi-
cine, Antwerp (Belgium) (IRB number IRB/AC/ac/197)
and the Uganda National Council for Science and Tech-
nology (number SS 2920).
Results
We integrated the results from the review of relevant doc-
uments and from the interviews with KIs. These findings
are presented in three sections, namely, the roles played
by the different stakeholders, the stakeholders’ level of
support and influence, and other external influences on
the uptake of evidence. The respondents reported that evi-
dence informed the malaria treatment policy change,
which was supported by the review of documents. For ex-
ample, documentation of the malaria treatment policy
change process in Uganda (MoH 2006) states that “the
decision to change the malaria treatment policy was
based mainly on evidence from efficacy studies, which
showed high resistance of plasmodium falciparum to
CQ”. Other types of evidence were also used. For example,
one research remarked that “communities complained first
‘I have been taking this medicine for malaria with no
improvement’. This was then picked up by the health
workers and then by the scientists”. Additional different
types of evidence were cited in all 18 documents that were
reviewed.
Roles played by the different stakeholders in the uptake
of evidence
Throughout the process of policy formulation, decision
making, policy adoption, and implementation, stake-
holders participated in various task forces charged with
the responsibilities of developing the new policy and
mainstreaming its implementation in routine processes.
The review of documents supported this. Documenta-
tion of the malaria treatment policy change process in
Uganda (MoH 2006) stated that “having reached a con-
sensus that the malaria treatment policy needs to change
in light of high resistance to the first line anti-malarials,
task forces including experts in malaria from the different
institutions/agencies were commissioned to work out the
policy change and implementation process”. The available
documentation further indicated that the different task
forces were expected to use available evidence in their
deliberation. For example, the report of the supply chain
management task force (MoH 2004) stated that “the task
force calculated the amount of AL required based on
the malaria prevalence, health seeking behaviour, and
population growth rate” [40]. Similarly, a report of the
task force on treatment guidelines and training approaches
(MoH 2004) indicated that their goal was to “update the
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evidence”.
The majority of stakeholders played multiple roles in
the uptake of evidence in policy development and imple-
mentation (Table 3). For example, the donors’ roles
encompassed providing funding for evidence generation,
participating in research processes through regular up-
dates and discussions of preliminary results, drafting the
new policy through their membership in working groups
that discussed policy options given the available evi-
dence, and supporting evidence implementation through
provision of funds and free medicines.
The top management and technical programmes in
the MoH reportedly led the policy development process,
including discussions on the best options given the avail-
able evidence on drug efficacy and health expenditures
trends. This was further supported by the review of
documents. For example, the concept paper for imple-
menting the ACT policy (MoH 2004) stated that “the
MoH is responsible for overall coordination of the policyTable 3 Roles played by the different stakeholders
Stakeholders Ro




Presidential Malaria Initiative/USAID Fu







Private pharmaceutical companies Im
Public sector Top management of MoH De
Technical programmes within MoH Ad
pr
Ministry of Finance Pr
Parliamentarians Di
Service providers at national referral institutions Pr
Service providers at lower levels Im
NDA Re
National Medical Store and Joint Medical Store Su
Researchers in universities Pr
Community The community Be
Local leaders Opinion leaders at national level Di
Leaders at the local level Di
Private sectors CSOs Pa
an
Private practitioners Im
Researchers from private research institutions Pr
Private sector—companies Adchange process”. Technical programmes within the MoH,
specifically the national malaria control programme
(NMCP), also engaged in research processes. In par-
ticular, one researcher remarked that “At the time of
doing the studies, the NMCP was part of this, so they
approved the studies. Then at the level of the studies
getting approved by the review committees, they were
always inquisitive to see whether the NMCP was on
board”. On the other hand, the NDA reportedly played
the role of medicine registration and regulation. Again,
this was supported by the review of documents, as the re-
port of the workshop on strategies for implementation of
the new antimalarial policy (MoH 2006) stated that
“COARTEM was officially registered as an antimalarial
medicine by the NDA in June 2006”.
CSOs played roles spanning from involvement in re-
search by participating in regular updates to incorporating
evidence into the new policy via participation in discus-
sions regarding policy options and implementation of evi-
dence through their programmes. Members of parliamentles
nding the policy change
oviding evidence and technical assistance (TA), participating in the policy
ocess, funding research
oviding evidence, participating in the policy process
nding research and participating in the policy process
nding research and participating in the policy process




apting and implementing the policy, participating in research
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neficiaries of the policy change
sseminating information on the policy change
sseminating information on the policy change
rticipating in policy discussions, research, advocacy, and implementation
d monitoring of the new policy
plementing the new policy
oviding evidence and participating in the policy process
vocacy, publicity, donations
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Supporting this, the malaria prevention and control hand-
book for parliamentarians (MoH 2005) stated that “the
development of this handbook is yet another opportunity
to provide information to Members of Parliament to
enhance their ability to communicate and disseminate
information on malaria prevention and control from
an informed position” [41].
Respondents reported that researchers also engaged in
policy discussions—particularly when evidence was dis-
cussed—to guide selection of the best option, as well as
reviewed drafts of the new policy. Opinion leaders at the
national and district levels reportedly disseminated infor-
mation on the policy change, along with reasons necessi-
tating the policy change with reference to evidence on
drug resistance, and mobilised communities to take up
the new policy. The communication strategy for treatment
of uncomplicated malaria using AL (MoH 2004) statesFigure 2 Support and influence of the different stakeholders involvedthat “Influential persons and leaders at the national and
district levels were armed with information on the new
treatment and were requested to share information with
the community and advocate for compliance”.
Notably, the role of Novartis—the pharmaceutical com-
pany that was manufacturing ACTs—was not reflected in
the reviewed documents. It was also striking that commu-
nities were not reflected as stakeholders in the reviewed
documents, and private practitioners were only involved
as trainees in preparation for rolling out the new policy.
Stakeholders’ levels of support and influence in evidence
uptake in the policy process
Figure 2 shows the levels of support and influence of the
different stakeholders in the evidence uptake in the policy
process. Some stakeholders were reportedly very influential
because they had significant resources, were highly
respected, exercised a strong influence on the MoH,in the malaria treatment policy change.
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the decision regarding which options were adopted and
the subsequent policy implementation heavily depended
on their opinion.
Although the majority of respondents believed that the
evidence demonstrated a need to change the malaria
treatment policy, there was no consensus regarding the
best alternative. Some research groups presented evi-
dence showing that AL was effective, while others had
evidence showing the effectiveness of amodiaquine (AQ)
and artesunate (AS). A donor respondent reported that
“there was a lot of influence pushing everyone for ACTs
but some stakeholders were pushing for amodiaquine
(AQ) and artesunate (AS). When AL was selected, the
push for AQ and AS continued and the team had to go
back and decided to have these as an alternative”.
Novartis, the pharmaceutical company that manufac-
tures AL, was reportedly supportive of the change to
AL. Some respondents reported a possible influence of
Novartis on the MoH, on the Global Fund (GF), and in
the decision-making process regarding which alterna-
tive antimalarial to adopt, as shown in the following
quotes:
“There were some experiences of people being taken to
workshops to discuss the malaria treatment policy
change and subsequently visiting the factories—the AL
manufacturers. This may have influenced the decision
to adopt AL.” MoH respondent“The pharmaceutical company Novartis could have
been talking to the GF, who were saying that the GF
grants should only be used for buying ACTs. This was
at a time the MoH was applying for GF round 4. So I
think, there could possibly have been some external
influence to change to AL.” Researcher respondent
The MoH was not unified in the process. Some MoH
officers were reportedly influential and supportive of the
change to AL, while others acted more as passive resis-
tors and were less influential. The NMCP was reportedly
very supportive and influential, because the adoption of
AL as the first-line antimalarial and its subsequent im-
plementation heavily depended on them. Additionally,
the NMCP officers strongly believed in evidence. They
closely followed the research results from the sentinel
sites and regularly met with the researchers. One re-
searcher remarked that “at the time that the malaria
treatment policy changed from CQ/SP to ACTs, the
NMCP was in the hands of two people who both be-
lieved in evidence and the researchers worked very
closely with malaria control programme leadership.”
The passive resistors were not convinced of the need
to change to ACTs (specifically AL), despite the evidenceshowing their effectiveness. They thought the decision
to change was influenced by donors, as shown in the fol-
lowing quotes:
“Regarding anti-malaria drugs, we had our own
sentinel sites around the country and we were
gathering sensitivity data on existing and alternative
anti-malarials. So, yes, there was CQ resistance but, we
were looking at, I think, AQ as an alternative.” MoH
respondent“Although efficacy data showed resistance to CQ, we
were not yet ready for a treatment change. We would
have moved at the right time, but when the GF
insisted that GF grants should only be used to buy
ACTs, it became difficult to opt for another
alternative.” MoH respondent
Top management staff of the MoH were noted to be
weak and passive supporters. One respondent reported
that the top management cadre could have been influ-
enced by the divided opinions at the technical level, stat-
ing the following:
“the technical programmes in the MoH were divided.
We had a very strong personality like [X] in the
NMCP who was very clear. Then there were people
who were doubtful despite availability of evidence. If
the technical programmes were very clear maybe even
top management would have been convinced and
rallied behind the decision. The technical
programmes wavered in their positions and that
could have had an influence on top management.”
MoH respondent
Researchers were reportedly very influential because
they were highly respected even if they were divided. In
terms of the research results, there was a consensus re-
garding the high levels of resistance to CQ/SP; however,
there were arguments among researchers as to what al-
ternative drug was most suitable, given the evidence
showing effectiveness of both ACT specifically (AL) and,
AQ and AS. A donor respondent remarked that “some
researchers did not think we needed to change to ACTs
(AL). They were saying this was commercially driven and
that other options like AQ and AS would have been more
appropriate”. Some respondents felt that some researchers
used evidence to exert pressure, as one journalist made the
following remark: “there was a man called [Y] who wrote
an article in the Lancet criticizing the MoH and WHO for
sticking with CQ/SP as the first-line treatment. He was
saying ‘look, you are having CQ/SP and both of them
were having high resistance rates; so by combining the
two you are not making matters any better’”.
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munity, noting that some of the research teams had
been funded by donors who did not support choosing
AL as an alternative first-line drug. There were suspi-
cions that the researchers were perhaps being influ-
enced, as shown in the following quote:
“These researchers were funded by donors, and those
particular donors had different views on possible
alternative anti-malarials. When these researchers
presented their results, there was a lot of disbelief
initially. People made statements like ‘Anyway, if you
look for the resistance you will find it’. We were using
CQ/SP properly and no one was complaining until
efficacy studies started reviewing the data. Then we
started saying we have resistance to CQ/SP.” Donor
respondent
Donors were also divided. While they were reportedly
very influential, they seemed to rally behind the evidence
generated from the studies that they supported, as
shown in the following quote:
“I remember some donors were in for AQ and AS,
while others were in for AL. So the MoH, as the chair
at that time, listened to both sides as they debated.
We listened to the pros and cons of the evidence they
were giving and at the end we decided to opt for AL,
based on the evidence we had and other considerations.
Although AQ/AS was more affordable and its
efficacy was more than 90%; artemether had an
efficacy of 99% and in most areas 100%. We did not
want to go through another costly policy change
process in the near future so we opted for AL.” MoH
respondent
The WHO reportedly had a strong influence on the
MoH, as shown in the following quotes:
“The WHO has the greatest influence on health policy
in the world with relation to disease areas like HIV,
malaria, etc. So Uganda as a country will often look
at the WHO for the decisions that it makes. The WHO
has some of the best doctors in the world and they are
looking at all of the evidence that is published, and
weighing the different evidence to try and make
decisions on what makes sense. So countries rely on the
decision making ability of the WHO and use that in
their own decision making.” Donor respondent“I remember our guidance was that any research that
was conducted and funded by the WHO was most
credible, because we rely on the WHO’s advice and take
the WHO recommendations seriously.”MoH respondent.The review of documents further supported this, as
the documentation of the malaria treatment policy
change process in Uganda (MoH 2006) stated that “the
WHO provided technical assistance and each of the five
combinations treatments recommended by WHO for
the African Region at that time was considered as a
possible alternative” [42]. Although the WHO was seen
as a neutral body, there were some suspicions that per-
haps the WHO was being influenced by the manufac-
turers of AL. One donor respondent said that “the
WHO had a fair share of that suspicion because, in the
interest of promoting ACTs as the most effective, the WHO
went into an arrangement with the manufacturers of AL.
They believed that this was one of the best ACTs, and
negotiated with the manufacturer so that countries will
get a reduced price. Fortunately, ACTs happened to
come out as the best option for most of the countries”.
The review of documents supported this view, as the
documentation of the malaria treatment policy change
process in Uganda (MoH 2006) stated that “the Project
Management Unit (PMU) of GF in the MoH was man-
dated to procure COARTEM® (AL) through the WHO,
taking into consideration the agreements between WHO
and Novartis Pharmaceutical Company, which provides
for subsidized COARTEM® (AL) for the public sector”.
Communities were weak and largely non-participatory.
One donor remarked that “We don’t involve the commu-
nity in policy discussions. We do not even disseminate
evidence to them. We assume and choose what we think
is good for them and we just take it to them”. Indeed,
among the reported roles played by the community, re-
spondents only mentioned “beneficiaries of the policy
change”.
Service providers at the national referral hospital and
at the district levels were both reported as resistors, but
for different reasons. At the national level, the service
providers were not convinced that the change was
needed. For example, one donor remarked that “some
senior consultants from Mulago hospital (national referral
hospital) didn’t think that we needed to change to ACTs.
They were saying that this was commercially driven”. The
service providers at the district level were apparently
rather passive resistors, with one service providers stating
that “the case of non-compliant health workers was a small
barrier that was eventually beaten. Some health workers
resisted but eventually they had to follow”. This may have
stemmed from their lack of effective involvement in the
part of the decision-making process where evidence justi-
fying a policy change was discussed. One donor remarked
that “I can tell you that we only got views of district
level service providers indirectly from the studies, but
not directly. We got a few district health workers into
the policy discussions but not so much beyond that”.
Service providers at the district level were not even aware
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level. One of them stated that “we have a problem of poor
dissemination of evidence. A lot of evidence is generated
but is poorly presented and does not reach clinicians”.
Another service provider stated that “there was no local
evidence, e.g. the local laboratory network was not consulted,
(…). Clinical trials must be carried out, but this was not
done”, indicating a lack of awareness of the evidence that
had been discussed extensively at the national level.
Parliamentarians were weak and passive supporters, al-
though some of them disseminated evidence to their
constituents and sensitised communities about the new
policy. The review of documents revealed targeted dis-
semination of evidence to parliamentarians. In fact, a
special handbook was developed for them, which was
intended to raise awareness among parliamentarians as
well as to empower them with the information that they
required to effectively mobilise their constituents.
Other external influences impacting evidence uptake
Respondents raised concerns regarding the extent to
which evidence can guide decision making in policy de-
velopment amidst external influences. This is illustrated
by the following quotes:
“My experience is that while evidence is actually
required and very strongly talked about, we also face
external influences in the policy process. You actually
notice that the evidence was glossed over by pressure.”
MoH respondent“I think there was a lot of advocacy for ACTs. If I
remember well, advocacy papers were written saying
that evidence has shown that there is no resistance to
ACTs at all anywhere in the world. There was an
advocacy letter that had been written by [Z] saying
children were dying because we are treating them with
CQ and not with ACTs. And then of course, there was
a lot of push, given that many countries had started to
use ACTs.” Researcher respondent
In light of these external influences, respondents de-
cried the lack of systems to manage conflicts of interest.
A MoH respondent remarked that “we don’t have systems
for managing conflicts of interest. That’s the difference
between the MoH and some research institutions like
the Uganda National Academy of Health Sciences where I
am a member. The first meeting is to prove that no one
has a conflict of interest. We always have to sign and agree
on the procedure.”
Discussion
Our present results identified a diverse group of stake-
holders who played multiple roles and had varying levelsof influence and support, which poses a challenge to evi-
dence uptake. Woelk et al. documented similar chal-
lenges to evidence uptake in a case regarding efficacy of
bed nets, where a diverse group of stakeholders differed
in their interpretation and use of evidence, and aligned
with different positions based on ideology and commer-
cial interests [27]. The present findings also support the
argument by Sumner et al. that the stakeholders’ roles
and levels of influence will differ based on the nature of
the policy and their interest in a given issue [43].
Our findings showed that donors, CSOs, the MoH,
service providers, and researchers engaged in the role of
evidence generation. Lack of evidence is a known barrier
to KT [21,39], which donors addressed by providing
funding and technical assistance to undertake research.
However, scholars have cautioned about remaining con-
cerns regarding the relevance and objectivity of donor-
supported research [30,43,44]. Indeed, in our study, we
noted that the different donors tended to rally behind
the evidence that was generated from the research stud-
ies that they supported.
Although the literature has highlighted that CSOs have
limited capacity for evidence generation [20], we found
that CSOs did participate in this area. Malik et al. also
documented a successful experience where a CSO played
a central role in evidence generation leading to change of
the malaria treatment policy in Sudan [29]. This supports
the augment by Tomlinson et al. that the roles played
by the different actors will differ depending on the nature
of the policy [26]. We further note that the researchers
and policymakers showed close working relationships,
which have previously been described as complex [21,45].
Researchers engaged in generating evidence addressing
policy-relevant research questions, and interactions with
the MoH enhanced evidence uptake.
Dissemination of evidence was performed by the MoH,
parliamentarians, and opinion leaders at the national and
local levels. In contrast, the literature highlighted that the
media, knowledge brokers, and structures either within or
external to the MoH undertake such evidence dissemin-
ation [6,9]. This difference could be explained by the
present targeted dissemination of evidence and provision
of advocacy materials to the parliamentarians and local
leaders. The involvement of local leaders could also ex-
plain how the communities became aware of the policy
change [46] despite their lack of systematic involvement
in evidence generation and decision making. The lack of
community participation in KT is a long-standing concern
and occurs partly due to the absence of appropriate struc-
tures for meaningful community engagement [44,46]. In
this regard, opinion leaders are potential stakeholders who
can support evidence dissemination and subsequently im-
prove KT. The present study also suggested a need to fur-
ther explore the role of parliamentarians in KT.
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was played by donors, the MoH, researchers, and service
providers through representation. Uptake of evidence
performed by donors has been described as supportive
or disruptive, depending on the policy in question, their
interests, and the nature of the evidence [47]. One rele-
vant concern is that significant financial flows to support
health programmes may give the donors undue influence
in decision making [48]. Cases have been documented in
which policy decisions were made based on the donors’
influence despite available evidence supporting alterna-
tive decisions [29,46,49]. This was also noted in our
study, as one respondent stated that Global Fund “…
were saying the Global Fund grants should only be used
for buying ACTs…”, while the MoH was relying on the
Global Fund round 4 to fund implementation of the new
policy. Challenges of donor dependency have also been
reported in other countries. For instance, Cameroon’s
national efforts to coordinate research were undermined
[50] and, in Ghana, changes in HIV treatment guidelines
were influenced by the conditions of donor financing
[49]. Hutchinson et al. similarly reported that the do-
nors’ active involvement in evidence generation and pol-
icy development influenced decision making [51].
Some have argued that the MoH should lead the KT
process in order to ensure focus on country priorities
[52,53]. In our present study, the top management and
technical programmes within the MoH led the policy de-
velopment process and considered evidence in decision
making. However, it was of concern that MoH officials
were divided regarding the decision to change and what
alternative first-line antimalarial to adopt. This may be
explained by several reasons. Firstly, although some
MoH officials followed the research process, they may
not have had a specific position on which evidence to
adopt, as it was reported that “…the chair at that time
listened to both sides as they debated. We listened to the
pros and cons of the evidence they were giving…”. Sec-
ondly, evidence may not have been comprehensive
enough to allow decision making, which was supported
by the statement that “…and at the end we decided to
opt for AL, based on the evidence we had and other
considerations”. Similarly, Mubyazi and Gonzalez-Block
[16] documented instances where the decision to change
the malaria treatment policy was protracted as decision
makers kept requesting more evidence on different as-
pects of policy development. The policy process analysed
in the present study took 25 months.
The top management cadre of the MoH that was ultim-
ately responsible for decision making was noted to be a
weak and passive supporter, which could be explained
by their limited involvement in the research processes.
Panisset et al. documented successful experiences in
Bangladesh, in which the involvement of the DirectorateGeneral of Health Services in the research process en-
hanced the uptake of zinc for use in diarrhoea manage-
ment among young children [28]. Another possible
explanation could be that the top management officials
had different views regarding what the best alternative
was, partly influenced by the different positions of the
technical programmes. This implies that realisation of
successful KT requires that the technical teams that
guide top management must be convinced about the
evidence and must reach a consensus on possible pol-
icy options. Additionally, despite time constraints, the
top management have to take a keen interest in evi-
dence synthesis and interpretation. The time constraints
could be alleviated by provision of evidence in brief di-
gestible formats and the use of advisors and think
tanks [47,54].
The participation of researchers in the policy develop-
ment process improved evidence uptake [14]. Although
the researchers were divided regarding the best alterna-
tive to adopt, their participation in the policy formula-
tion and decision making, including discussions of the
different options, enabled consideration of other evi-
dence relevant to this decision. Indeed, health expend-
iture trends were discussed alongside efficacy data to
assess affordability.
In the majority of countries, implementation of evi-
dence is performed by the MoH, public and private ser-
vice providers, and CSOs [20]. However, in our present
case study, the role of private for profit providers ap-
pears to have been maximised, as similarly noted in
other studies of KT in Uganda [55,56].
It has been reported that actors play different roles de-
pending on the nature of the policy and their level of
interest in a given issue [26,27,43], and our present find-
ings support this position. For example, in our earlier
study of actors in KT in Uganda [30], CSOs were not re-
ported to engage in evidence generation. This may be
explained by the varied technical capacity of CSOs, in
that they may internally possess the skills required to en-
gage in certain types of research processes, but not in all
cases. Indeed, Pollard et al. have noted that the varied
capacity of CSOs is a limitation to their effective engage-
ment [20]. Our earlier study of the roles of actors in KT
also reported that CSOs and the media engaged in the
dissemination of evidence. Their failure to engage in
dissemination of evidence in the malaria treatment
change may have been due to the absence of targeted
dissemination. The literature emphasises the import-
ance of providing information in a simple and clear
format [12], which was not done in our present case
study. On the other hand, donors and researchers were
not reported as actors in the policy process, yet we
noted their participation in the case of malaria treat-
ment policy change.
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lack of systems to manage conflicts of interest. Boyd and
Bero emphasised the importance of identifying and man-
aging conflict of interest in order to improve evidence
uptake [57]. The proposed steps include soliciting infor-
mation from actors regarding possible conflict of interest,
having explicit criteria to determine whether the disclosed
financial or other competing interest indeed constitute a
conflict of interest, and finally, providing guidance on how
confirmed conflicts should be managed.
Policy implications
Stakeholders in KT play different roles and exert differ-
ent levels of influence and support based on the nature
of the policy and the evidence under consideration. This
raises the need to map relevant stakeholders and to
work out mechanisms for their involvement and for how
evidence can be utilised by all in an objective manner.
Provision of regular updates along research processes
and targeted dissemination of evidence beyond in-country
stakeholders may enhance inclusiveness and consensus
building. Additionally, given the multiple array of stake-
holders, there is a need to utilise mechanisms to manage
conflict of interest.
Strengths and weaknesses of the study
Our study has several strengths. Firstly, we interviewed a
wide array of stakeholders and used multiple data collec-
tion methods, which provided a rich data set to use in
assessing the roles and influence of stakeholders in evi-
dence uptake. Secondly, the multidisciplinary nature of
the research team helped to ensure objectivity in the
data analysis and interpretation. Thirdly, interviews were
conducted by the first author who is experienced with
policy development in Uganda.
The study also had several weaknesses. Firstly, recall
bias may have impacted the accuracy of the responses,
given the timing of the policy process and data collec-
tion. However, we noted consistency among the re-
sponses, suggesting that perhaps recall bias was not as
much of a problem as might be anticipated. Secondly,
with the exception of researchers, we considered stake-
holders to be organisations/institutions/units. It should
be noted that individuals may not necessarily represent
the views of the institution in which they work; however,
this was not explored in our study. Thirdly, it is possible
that the stakeholders’ levels of influence and support in
the uptake of evidence in policy could change at the dif-
ferent stages of policy development, but this was also
not assessed in our study.
Conclusions
Stakeholders played multiple roles in the uptake of evi-
dence in the malaria treatment policy change in Uganda.The donors, MoH, service providers, and researchers en-
gaged in the role of evidence generation. The MoH, par-
liamentarians, and opinion leaders at the national and
local levels engaged in dissemination of evidence. The
donors, MoH, researchers, and service providers through
representation engaged in the uptake of evidence in policy
development and implementation. Stakeholders exerted
varying levels of support and influence for different rea-
sons. For example, donors were influential due to their
significant financial support, researchers were influential
because they commanded respect, and the MoH was in-
fluential because the uptake of evidence and subsequent
policy implementation heavily depended on them. It is
noteworthy that all of the influential actors were divided
regarding the best alternative antimalarial to adopt.
Our findings suggest that the roles and influence of
stakeholders in KT will vary given the nature of the pol-
icy and the available evidence. For a given KT process,
mapping the relevant stakeholders and devising mechan-
ism for their engagement and for resolving conflicts of
interest will enhance the uptake of evidence in policy de-
velopment. Additionally, structures and systems must be
put in place to encourage community participation in re-
search processes and decision making.
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